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Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in
Privacy Analogies*
Victoria Schwartz**
When a photographer takes unauthorized aerial photographs of a company’s plant, the
legal framework under which courts evaluate the case, as well as its likely outcome,
depends on whether the photographer was hired by a private actor or the government. If
a competitor hired the photographer, the aerial photography may constitute improper
trade secret misappropriation. If, however, the government hired the photographer, the
aerial photography would not violate the Fourth Amendment. This dichotomy illustrates
a public-private divide in which privacy violations by the government are treated
differently from privacy violations by the private sector. Despite this divide, some courts
have analogized from the Fourth Amendment to the trade secret context, while the
Supreme Court has rejected such an analogy in the opposite direction.
A similar but reverse phenomenon occurs in the workplace privacy context.
Traditionally, whether an employee whose privacy has been invaded by an employer is
likely to prevail in court depends in part on whether the employer is in the public or
private sector. The longstanding wisdom is that public-sector employees receive stronger
workplace privacy protections than similarly situated private-sector employees as a result
of Fourth Amendment protections. Nonetheless, unlike the trade secret context, Supreme
Court precedent suggests that private-sector analogies are appropriate in evaluating
public workplace privacy cases.

* Title and Article in memory of Dan Markel who generously provided priceless written and
verbal feedback including the suggestion for this title, and whose voice remains in my head whenever I
am writing asking me, “Is this a Puzzle paper or a Problem paper?”
** Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D. 2007, Harvard Law
School; B.S., B.A., 2004, Stanford University. Thank you to Gregory Boden and Zachary Price for
excellent research assistance and to Caley Turner for invaluable editorial assistance. I am grateful to
Paul Secunda, Lior Strahilevitz, and Adam Shinar for providing extensive feedback on earlier drafts. I
would also like to thank Ryan Calo, Jack Chin, David Han, Michael Helfand, Orin Kerr, Jon Michaels,
Paul Ohm, Elizabeth Pollman, Greg Reilly, and Sherod Thaxton for their thoughts and comments at
various stages of the process. Many thanks also to the participants at the Ninth Annual Colloquium on
Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, 2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, 2014
Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property, Prawfsfest XI, Pepperdine University School of Law Faculty
Research Workshop, and Southern California Junior Law Faculty Workshop where I presented earlier
versions of this Article.
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Despite this apparent inconsistency, neither courts nor scholars have offered any
systematic criteria for evaluating when privacy analogies across the public-private divide
are appropriate. Rather, courts import or reject privacy analogies between the public and
private sectors without any meaningful consideration of when such analogies make sense.
This Article offers a coherent and consistent normative framework to analyze when
privacy analogies are appropriate across the public-private divide. In deciding whether
such privacy analogies make sense, courts ought to apply a multifactored test in which
they consider the presence or absence of factors regarding the privacy-invading actor that
could justify the traditional public-private distinction. These factors include power of
coercion, ability to harm identity formulation or protection of democracy, access to
superior technology, and presence of bureaucratic features.
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Introduction
An airplane flies over an industrial plant that has not yet been
completed. No barriers prevent aerial viewing of the plant. Employees at
the plant find the airplane suspicious and investigate. They discover that
the airplane carried a photographer who had been hired to photograph the
plant on behalf of an unidentified competitor. After the photographer
1
refuses to reveal who hired him, the company sues the photographer.
Applying state trade secret law, a federal appellate court finds that the
aerial photography could constitute improper means and allows the
company to proceed with its lawsuit for misappropriation of a trade
2
secret. The court explains that although the company had taken no
precautions to protect against aerial surveillance during construction of
3
the plant, the law does not require taking “unreasonable precautions”
against actions “which could not have been reasonably anticipated or
4
prevented.” Thus, in a sense, the court suggested that the company had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial photography of its plant.
Another airplane flies over a different industrial plant. Again no
barriers prevent aerial viewing of the plant. Employees at the plant have
been instructed to investigate any low-level flights over the plant. Upon
further investigation, the employees discover that the airplane belongs to
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) which had requested
and been refused permission to conduct a second on-site inspection of
the plant at issue. Instead of obtaining an administrative search warrant,
the EPA hired an aerial photographer to photograph the facility from
5
above. The company sues the EPA. Applying Fourth Amendment law
6
and its “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Supreme Court
holds in favor of the EPA, concluding that “the taking of aerial
photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is
7
not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Notably, the Court
finds the prior judicial determination that similar aerial photography by a
competitor could be actionable under trade secret law to be “irrelevant”

1. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970); see infra
Part I.A.
2. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015.
3. Id. at 1017.
4. Id. at 1016.
5. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1986); see infra Part I.A.
6. Although the Court never quite explicitly says that the company does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial photography, this is apparent throughout the analysis and appears
to be part of the basis for the Court’s conclusion. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 235 (“Dow further
contends that any aerial photography of this ‘industrial curtilage’ intrudes upon its reasonable
expectations of privacy. . . . [T]he Court has drawn a line as to what expectations are reasonable in the
open areas beyond the curtilage of a dwelling . . . .”).
7. Id. at 239.
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to its consideration of whether the EPA’s aerial photography violated
8
the company’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
The aerial photography example illustrates the public-private divide
in privacy law. Under the public-private divide, courts analyze privacy
violations by the government under a Fourth Amendment analysis that
typically includes a determination of whether the plaintiff has a
9
reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts have made abundantly clear,
however, that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the private
10
sector. Thus, depending on the particular facts of the case, courts
analyze privacy violations by private actors under a variety of other
possible legal frameworks including state constitutional privacy
11
12
13
14
provisions, federal statutes, state statutes, state privacy torts and even
15
state trade secret law. Many of these legal frameworks contain doctrinal
concepts analyzing the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s expectations of
16
privacy, many of which can be similar to, but not always identical to the
17
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.
This creates an analytical conundrum for courts. On the one hand,
there exists an entrenched public-private divide in privacy law, in which
the Court has repeatedly found that the Fourth Amendment does not

8. Id. at 232.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
323 (1997).
11. Unlike its federal counterpart, the California state constitution’s privacy protections apply to
the private sector. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994).
12. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (applying to private-sector
recordkeeping); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2013); id. § 201; id.
§ 2703 (applying to electronic submissions and known unofficially as the “Stored Communications
Act”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (applying
to health information privacy).
13. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 435 (West 1998) (prohibiting employers from recording an
employee in a restroom); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-471 (2009) (requiring businesses collecting social
security numbers to create a privacy protection policy).
14. For a detailed overview of the privacy tort and its development, see Daniel J. Solove & Paul
M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law 77–231 (3d ed. 2009).
15. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970).
16. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B (1974) (“A person shall have a right against
unreasonable . . . interference with his privacy.”). See Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 557
N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990) (dismissing a section 1B tort claim because the plaintiff lacked a
“reasonable expectation of privacy”); Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073–74 (Cal. 2009)
(“The right to privacy in the California Constitution set standards similar to the common law tort of
intrusion. . . . [W]e consider (1) the nature of any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy,
and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification and other relevant
interests.”) (emphasis added).
17. For example, although it is not formally an element of the claim, in order to succeed on an
intrusion upon seclusion privacy tort, courts typically ask some variation on whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 373 (8th Cir. 2002).
Similarly, as explained in the aerial photography example, trade secret cases can involve a
determination of whether the plaintiff used reasonable precautions in protecting the trade secret.
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18

apply to the private sector. On the other hand, the very fluid concept of
a reasonable expectation of privacy is a heavily norm-driven inquiry
requiring by its very nature an inquiry into the prevailing societal norms.
Thus the question remains whether courts conducting a reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis in a Fourth Amendment case can or
should look to private-sector cases by analogy to help determine whether
an expectation of privacy is reasonable. The aerial photography example
suggests that the Court insists on maintaining the strict divide between
the public and private sectors with regard to privacy law by rejecting
analogies to private sector privacy law cases when analyzing the
reasonable expectation of privacy in factually similar public sector
19
cases.
To complicate matters, in the workplace privacy context, the Court
has taken a different approach to analogizing across the public-private
20
divide in privacy law. Suppose an employer wants to administer a drug
test to an employee. Or, the employer wants to search the employee’s
desk, or place a tracking device on them, or place a video camera in the
workplace. The way courts analyze these various workplace privacy
invasions varies depending on whether the employer is in the private or
21
public sector. Under the traditional public-private divide, public-sector
employees whose workplace privacy claims are evaluated under a Fourth
Amendment framework receive stronger protection than their private22
sector equivalents. Unlike its staunch adherence to a strict publicprivate divide and refusal to analogize across that divide in the aerial
photography trade secret example, the Supreme Court considers employee
expectations of privacy in the private sector a relevant consideration in the
23
Fourth Amendment analysis of public-sector workplace privacy cases.
These diametrically different approaches by courts all the way up to
the Supreme Court in terms of analogizing across the public-private
divide result in a lack of clarity as to whether analogizing across the
public-private divide is appropriate. Courts appear to freely analogize
between the private sector privacy frameworks and the Fourth

18. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
323 (1997).
19. See infra Part I.A. For a discussion of the public-private distinction more generally, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 504 (1985).
20. See infra Part I.B. For a discussion of the public-private divide in the workplace context, see
S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace,
32 Ga. L. Rev. 825, 828 (1998) (“Central to the understanding of privacy rights in the American
workplace is the public/private distinction.”).
21. See Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 277, 283–302
(2012).
22. See id. at 27879 (noting the conventional wisdom that public employees under the Fourth
Amendment had greater expectations of privacy than their private-sector counterparts).
23. See infra Part I.B.
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Amendment framework when it suits them and staunchly defend against
such analogies when that is preferable. So can courts conducting a
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in a Fourth Amendment case
look to private-sector cases by analogy to help determine whether an
expectation of privacy is reasonable? Or conversely, in deciding whether a
private-sector privacy violation would be “highly offensive to a reasonable
person,” as is required in a number of privacy torts, can or should courts
look to factually similar Fourth Amendment cases by analogy for some
perspective as to what is considered reasonable? Similarly, should courts
look to Fourth Amendment discussions of reasonableness in order to help
determine by analogy whether plaintiffs took reasonable precautions in
the context of a trade secret case? Very little has been said by either courts
or scholars on how to systematically decide when these types of analogies
24
are appropriate.
This Article seeks to fill that void by developing a coherent and
consistent normative framework for considering when such privacy
analogies are appropriate across the public-private divide. In order to do
so, this Article examines the systematic structural features of government
that may have traditionally necessitated a different degree of privacy
protection from the government than from private citizens and
companies. In doing so, it seeks to uncover the motivating principles
behind the Fourth Amendment that justify treating a similar privacyinvading fact pattern differently because the government is the actor
invading privacy. In other words, the Article seeks to explain the
intuition that public-sector privacy invasions are more threatening, and
thus more in need of protection than their private-sector counterparts.
The Article identifies four traditional features of government that
could make invasions of privacy by the government more troubling than
similar invasions of privacy by a private actor. First, the government has
25
traditionally had more coercive power than the private sector. Second,
government invasions of privacy may harm the ability of individuals to
form their own identity without interference or to act as the voice of
26
democracy against government waste, abuse, and fraud. Third, the
government, at least historically, had access to privacy-invading
27
technology that the private sector did not have. Finally, the lack of
accountability associated with bureaucratic features of government may
28
cause supplementary reasons for concern.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part II.A.4.
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These customary differences, however, are beginning to break down
29
in a modern world. This begs the question: once Google has satellite
technology, Amazon has drones, and numerous companies make use of
big data, does the superior technology justification behind a strict publicprivate divide in privacy law still make sense? Or in the context of
workplace privacy, do we consider the public-private divide differently if
the private-sector employer is in the field of big data, such that it may
have as much power and information over the employee as the
government? Is it obvious that the harm behind the National Security
Agency (“NSA”) collecting large amounts of e-mail metadata is different
30
in kind and scope to Google collecting the same data? Of course all of
these questions are made even more complicated by the fact that a good
31
deal of information is shared between the private and public sectors.
In light of these complications, this Article offers guidance to courts
and scholars considering the use of a privacy analogy across the publicprivate divide. When deciding whether to analogize between the Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and its privatesector doctrinal counterparts, courts should evaluate the presence of the
four identified features that traditionally made invasions of privacy by

29. See infra Part II.B.
30. The state action requirement of the federal Constitution does not in itself answer these
questions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Of course it goes without saying that the Fourth
Amendment only applies to government actors. That precedent is clearly settled and this Article does
not try to change the substantive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in any way. The established
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the state action doctrine, however, only set the standard on the
public-sector side of the comparison. The private-sector side of the comparison, currently covered by a
hodgepodge of federal and state privacy and other related laws, remains open to change. For example,
nothing prevents Congress from passing a law that states that private employees have the same degree
of protection from workplace privacy invasions as would their public-sector counterparts. Similarly,
nothing prevents a court from deciding that the appropriate standard for determining whether a
company has a trade secret requires looking to whether that company would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context. That may or may not be a good idea, but it
is open to discussion that goes beyond the claim that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
private sector.
31. Many scholars have written on the extent to which the government and private sectors share
information. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 Minn. L.
Rev. 1, 7 (2008) (“[T]he line between public and private modes of surveillance and security has blurred
if not vanished. Public and private enterprises are thoroughly intertwined.”); Amitai Etzioni, The
Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be Done?, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 929, 951 (2012) (“[O]ne must assume
that what is private is also public in two senses of these words: that one’s privacy (including sensitive
matters) is rapidly corroded by the private sector and that whatever it learns is also available to the
government.”); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309,
1320–21 (2012) (“The FBI and other law enforcement agencies will shift from being active producers
of surveillance to passive consumers, essentially outsourcing all of their surveillance activities to
private third parties, ones who are not only ungoverned by the state action requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, but also who have honed the ability to convince private citizens to agree to be
watched.”); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1095 (2002) (“[G]overnment is increasingly contracting with private-sector entities
to acquire databases of personal information.”).
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the government more troubling than similar invasions of privacy by a
private actor. The appropriateness of the analogy will require a
multifactored analysis considering the extent to which the government
and the private-sector actor in the relevant cases’ fact patterns contain
32
the four identified features.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the haphazard
way in which courts currently draw or refuse to draw analogies between
trade secret and Fourth Amendment cases. It then engages in a similar
analysis in the workplace privacy context. Part II explores the traditional
differences between the public and private sectors that may justify a
public-private divide in privacy law. This Part also identifies the ways in
which these traditional justifications no longer make sense in the modern
world. Part III uses the traditional differences identified in Part II as
benchmarks in a multifactored test to be used as a coherent and
consistent normative framework for courts and scholars considering use
of a privacy analogy across the public-private divide. It then illustrates
how that framework would work in various contexts.
I. The Traditional Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law
Traditionally, the American legal system has maintained a strict
divide between the public and private sectors with regard to privacy law.
A violation of privacy that occurs by a public-sector actor typically gets
33
filtered though a Fourth Amendment analysis. While the Fourth
34
Amendment does not actually use the word “privacy,” its prohibition
against certain searches and seizures necessarily protects against many
35
governmental invasions of privacy—traditionally those by the police.
Although scholars have contended that the Fourth Amendment should
36
not be viewed primarily through a privacy paradigm, there is little doubt

32. Admittedly, the factors identified in this Article are not novel concepts. Many of them already
play a role in various aspects of judicial decisionmaking, or have been identified by scholars as
important in other contexts. Furthermore, the factors likely only scratch the surface. The hope is that
they will trigger a conversation that will lead to privacy analogizing by courts and scholars occurring in
a coherent, rather than an ad hoc manner.
33. Public-sector privacy violations may also, depending on the specific facts, get analyzed under
the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and arguably other constitutional provisions as well;
however, the Fourth Amendment is the most likely basis for a claim.
34. The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
35. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1131.
36. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L.
Rev. 1016, 1060–77 (1995) (contending that the Fourth Amendment law’s concern with privacy has led
to abandoning a concern with coercion and violence); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751,
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that privacy plays a pivotal role in the Fourth Amendment framework.
This has been true at least since the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v.
United States added the “reasonable expectation of privacy” to the
37
Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Fourth Amendment does not, however, apply to the private
sector. Pursuant to the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court has
“consistently construed” the Fourth Amendment “as proscribing only
governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure,
even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of
38
any governmental official.’” Therefore, unlike privacy violations in the
public sector, privacy violations that occur in the private sector are not
analyzed under a Fourth Amendment framework. Consequently, the
Supreme Court has referred to the private sector as “a domain unguarded
39
by Fourth Amendment constraints.” Instead, courts analyze privatesector privacy violations under a hodgepodge of other legal frameworks
40
41
including state constitutional claims, topic-specific federal statutes, the
42
43
44
FTC’s privacy regulation, state statutes, state privacy torts and other
45
state common law claims such as trade secrets.

1777 (1994) (defining the “constitutional value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of ‘trust’
between the government and the citizenry”).
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Solove, supra
note 31, at 1118, 1121, 1128 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s focus has been on protecting
privacy against certain government actions, and that some notion of privacy has been the trigger for
Fourth Amendment protection at least since the late nineteenth century).
38. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Walter
v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
39. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
40. California’s state constitution contains privacy protections that also apply to the private
sector. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994).
41. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (applying to private-sector
recordkeeping); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2013); id. § 201;
id. § 2703 (applying to electronic submissions and known unofficially as the “Stored Communications
Act”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (applying
to health information privacy).
42. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014) (describing the FTC’s role in enforcing companies’ privacy
policies by using its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority as the functional equivalent of a
body of common law); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015)
(upholding the FTC’s power to regulate corporate cybersecurity failures that violate corporate privacy
policies under its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority).
43. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 435 (West 1998) (prohibiting employers from recording an
employee in a restroom); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-471 (2009) (requiring businesses collecting social
security numbers to create a privacy protection policy).
44. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif.
L. Rev. 1887, 1917 (2010) (noting that “nearly every state recognizes at least one form of the privacy
torts”).
45. See infra Part I.A.
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A. Trade Secret Law and the Fourth Amendment
This traditional public-private divide in privacy law plays out in the
context of certain trade secret law cases. Although trade secret doctrine
involves numerous concepts that do not exist in the Fourth Amendment
context, trade secret cases can involve violations of privacy in various
factual scenarios. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that trade
secret law is necessary to protect “a most fundamental right, that of
46
privacy.” Scholars have discussed the link between trade secret law and
47
privacy, and have described corporate privacy interests as part of the
48
“fundamental nature of trade secret rights.” Even Justices Brandeis and
Warren’s seminal field-creating Harvard Law Review article, The Right
to Privacy, argued that notions of privacy are embodied in trade secret
49
law.
At the doctrinal level, under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
50
(“UTSA”), which has been adopted by forty-seven states, one of the
ways in which trade secret misappropriation can occur is when someone
51
acquires a trade secret by “improper means.” Although the definition of
“improper means” does not explicitly list violations of privacy, some of
the possibilities listed such as theft or espionage can involve privacy
violations depending on the specific means by which the theft or
52
espionage occurs. Similarly, under the Restatement of Torts, a trade
secret violation can occur when someone discloses or uses a trade secret
53
that was discovered by improper means. Under either standard, a trade
secret plaintiff can prevail when a competitor or other individual invades
the privacy of the company in the course of acquiring a trade secret by
improper means.
46. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (“A most fundamental human
right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable; the
state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable.”).
47. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1125, 1152
(2000); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret
Law, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 667, 670.
48. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the
Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1425, 1431, 1434–35 (2009).
49. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 21213
(1890).
50. The UTSA has been adopted by every state except New York, North Carolina, and
Massachusetts. Texas became the forty-seventh state to adopt the UTSA in May 2013. Massachusetts
has introduced a bill to enact the UTSA, which remains pending as of this writing. Legislative Fact
Sheet – Trade Secrets Act, Uniform L. Commission, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?
title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
51. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(1) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985).
52. Id.
53. Restatement of Torts § 757 (Am. Law Inst. 1939). The Restatement holds a trade secret
violation occurs when “[o]ne who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so,
is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use
constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” Id.
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Furthermore, the trade secret and Fourth Amendment contexts can
both involve extremely factually similar invasions of privacy from the
54
perspective of the company whose privacy is being invaded.
Nonetheless, as the result of the traditional public-private divide in
privacy law, a violation of privacy would be analyzed under entirely
distinct frameworks depending on whether the privacy invasion occurred
by the private sector, in which case a trade secret framework would
apply, or by the government, in which case the Fourth Amendment
framework would apply.
While it is abundantly clear that Fourth Amendment law does not
apply to private-sector trade secret cases, there are a number of
similarities between the two legal doctrines. For example, in the privatesector trade secret context, a claimed trade secret is not eligible for
protection if the owner did not use reasonable efforts to ensure that the
55
trade secret remained secret. Similarly, under the “reasonable expectation
of privacy test” in Katz, a Fourth Amendment claim only attaches if the
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy over the claimed private
domain. Thus, both doctrines involve consideration of the reasonableness of
the asserted claim to privacy.
The traditional public-private divide serves to filter private-sector
cases into a trade secret framework and public-sector cases into a Fourth
Amendment framework. At the same time, in many circumstances the
two types of cases may involve both similar fact patterns as well as some
doctrinal similarities between the two distinct legal frameworks. As such,
courts, advocates, and scholars might wonder whether it is appropriate to
analogize across the public-private divide in such cases. Specifically, in
deciding whether a trade secret plaintiff used reasonable efforts to
ensure that a trade secret remained secret, can and should courts
analogize to a factually similar case in the public Fourth Amendment
context in which a court determined whether similar efforts were
sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy? The idea is not
that Fourth Amendment precedent would be dispositive in trade secret
54. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to the privacy
interests of corporations. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy interests in business premises “is . . . based upon societal
expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment”); Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (observing, in the OSHA administrative search context, that “it is
untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of business as well as
of residence”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 30,
2014) (noting that “extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy
interests of employees and others associated with the company”).
55. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 674 (Wash. 1987) (“[T]rade secrets law
protects the author’s very ideas if they possess some novelty and are undisclosed or disclosed only on
the basis of confidentiality.”) (emphasis added); Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720,
725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that “the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the
information” is relevant to determining whether that information is a trade secret).
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cases, but merely that it would help flesh out, by analogy, what sorts of
efforts courts and society are prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Conversely, in deciding whether a plaintiff has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, can and
should courts analogize to a factually similar case in the trade secret
context in which a court determined that trade secret protective actions
were sufficiently reasonable to satisfy that aspect of the trade secret
analysis? Here again, the trade secret precedent would not be dispositive
of the entire Fourth Amendment claim, but merely helpful to analyze
what sorts of privacy claims courts and society are prepared to recognize
as reasonable.
Currently, courts lack any clarity or guidance for when such
analogizing is appropriate and have not developed a framework for
evaluating when the analogy makes sense. The two factually similar cases
involving aerial photography discussed briefly above and expounded
upon below illustrate this problem.
In E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed a trade secret case involving aerial photography of an industrial
56
plant owned by the plaintiff, DuPont. The case arose out of Texas
where an unknown third party, presumably one of DuPont’s competitors,
hired the Christophers to take aerial photographs of a DuPont plant that
57
was still under construction. DuPont had built the plant to facilitate the
production of methanol by means of a “highly secret but unpatented
58
process.” DuPont employees noticed the aircraft flying over the plant
and launched an investigation by which they discovered that the
Christophers had taken sixteen aerial photographs while circling the
59
plant in their aircraft.
DuPont filed suit alleging trade secret violation, and after the
Christophers refused to disclose who had hired them during their
60
depositions, the district court granted a motion to compel. The
Christophers sought an interlocutory appeal on whether DuPont had
61
stated a claim. The Christophers argued that they could not have
misappropriated DuPont’s claimed trade secret when they were “in public
airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did not breach any
confidential relation, and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal
62
conduct.” Applying the Restatement of Torts’ definition of a trade secret,

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1013–14.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
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which the Texas Supreme Court had adopted at the time, the Fifth
Circuit found that illegal conduct was not necessary for misappropriation,
and that the invasion of privacy that resulted from the aerial photography
64
was sufficient.
The Christophers argued that DuPont had not stated a proper claim
for trade secret misappropriation because DuPont did not take
reasonable precautions in its failure to cover the facility during
65
construction and thus allowed the facility to be viewed from the air. The
court rejected that argument, however, holding that it would be unfair to
permit espionage “when the protections required to prevent another’s
66
spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened.” The
court refused to go so far as to prevent viewing of “open fields,” but
explained that a trade secret owner should not be forced to “guard
against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable
67
methods of espionage now available.” Because the finished plant would
protect the process from view even from aerial espionage, requiring
DuPont to construct a temporary barrier over the unfinished plant
“would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a
68
school boy’s trick.” According to the court, requiring DuPont to create
69
an “impenetrable fortress” would be an unreasonable requirement.
Having thus concluded that the aerial photography was improper, the
court found that DuPont could sustain a cause of action for trade secret
70
violation against the Christophers for their actions.
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court heard a case with
somewhat similar facts, except that this time it was the government that
71
violated a corporation’s privacy by means of aerial photography. Unlike
in Christopher, however, where the Fifth Circuit held that aerial
photographs taken of a plant could sustain a cause of action for a trade
secret violation, the Court in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States rejected
the argument that aerial photographs taken of a plant by the government

63. Texas has since adopted the UTSA. See 6 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 134A.001 (2013).
64. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014. The Restatement holds a trade secret violation occurs when
someone “discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” Restatement of Torts § 757
(Am. Law Inst. 1939).
65. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1017.
70. Id. Practically speaking, of course, this “victory” may not have accomplished very much. The
Christophers were likely judgment proof, the aerial photographs had already been transferred to the
unknown third party, and DuPont still did not know the identity of the third-party competitor who had
hired the Christophers.
71. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
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violated the Fourth Amendment. Dow operated a 2000-acre facility in
Michigan that “consisted of numerous covered buildings with . . .
73
equipment and piping conduits . . . exposed” between the buildings.
Dow had “elaborate security” around the complex that prevented public
74
observation from the ground level. Also, Dow instructed its employees
75
to investigate any low-level flights over the facility. Dow did not,
76
however, construct any barriers to prevent aerial viewing.
In 1978, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of two power
77
plants located on the premises with the consent of Dow. The EPA
78
requested a second inspection, which Dow rejected. Rather than obtain
an administrative search warrant, the EPA hired a commercial aerial
photographer to take photographs of the facility with an aerial mapping
79
camera. Dow was not informed of the EPA’s actions and upon learning
of the aerial surveillance, filed for injunctive and declaratory relief
80
alleging in part that the EPA violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the plant was not analogous to the
curtilage of a dwelling and the photographs were not a search prohibited
81
by the Fourth Amendment. Because Dow had “elaborately secured” its
plant, the Court found that the space between the buildings fell
82
somewhere between both doctrines. The government has “‘greater
latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property’”
because the reasonable expectation of privacy is significantly different than
83
someone’s home. The difference here was that the aerial observation did
84
not involve a “physical entry.” Because it was observable to the public,
85
a government regulatory inspector should not need a warrant.
The Christopher case had enough factual similarity that it might
have been considered by the Court in Dow Chemical Co. as persuasive
authority in considering the reasonable expectation of privacy aspect of
the Fourth Amendment question. Both cases involved invasion of a
company’s privacy by means of aerial photography of a company facility.
Both cases required the court to consider whether the industrial plant
should be required to build a barrier preventing the facility from being
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 239.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 237–38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981)).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978)).
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viewed from the air, and whether failure to do so meant that the
company had not taken sufficient steps to protect its privacy. In Dow
Chemical Co., the Supreme Court apparently recognized these factual
similarities between the case before them involving a Fourth
Amendment claim for the EPA’s aerial photography, and the Fifth
Circuit precedent in Christopher holding that aerial photography of an
industrial plant could constitute a misappropriation of a trade secret
violation.
Instead of considering whether the Christopher case might at least
be persuasive authority, however, the Court stated that the trade secret
analogy was “irrelevant to the questions presented,” not because the case
was factually distinguishable, but rather because state tort law “does not
86
define the limits of the Fourth Amendment.” In support of its claim that
state tort law “does not define the limits of the Fourth Amendment,” the
87
Supreme Court cited Oliver v. United States for the proposition that
“trespass law does not necessarily define limits of [the] Fourth
Amendment.” The Court’s shift from a position that state tort law does
not have to define the limits of the Fourth Amendment to a position that
state tort law is “irrelevant to the questions presented” is significant. The
former formulation merely suggests that state tort law is not binding
when it comes to Fourth Amendment limits, or in other words that there
is a public-private divide in privacy law. The latter formulation, with its
claim to irrelevance, rejects not only the binding effect of state tort law,
but also any persuasive impact of state tort law or efforts to analogize
88
across the public-private divide. Viewing the public-private divide as
absolute, the Court refused to answer whether the same tactics employed
89
by a competitor would violate trade secret law.

86. Id. at 232 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)). The Court used the following
explanatory parenthetical in its citation of Oliver: “(trespass law does not necessarily define limits of
Fourth Amendment).” Id. While the Court argues that state law has no bearing on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it simultaneously points out that it “does not necessarily define [the]
limits,” which implies that tort or property law may set a boundary on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Id.
87. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
88. Sam Kamin describes Dow Chemical Co. as stating that “the fact that government conduct
would have been tortious or criminal if done by a private actor is but one factor to be considered in
determining whether that conduct violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Sam Kamin, The
Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. Rev.
83, 113–14 (2004). I disagree with that reading of the case. Nothing in Dow Chemical Co. suggests that
the Court would be willing to consider the private-sector conduct as even “one factor to be
considered.” Instead, the Court’s language consistently describes the private-sector precedent as
“irrelevant.” Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 232; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 459 n.3 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the decision in Dow Chemical Co. as the Court having “declined
to consider trade-secret laws indicative of a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
89. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 231.
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The partial dissent in Dow Chemical Co. by Justices Powell,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s
90
dismissal of the relevance of the trade secret analogy. The dissent noted
that previous decisions held that a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in the Fourth Amendment context “if it is rooted in a ‘source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
91
and permitted by society.’” Under their view, laws protecting trade
secrets can be persuasive analogies to demonstrate society’s beliefs
regarding a reasonable expectation of privacy.
To be clear, there were a number of factual differences by which the
Supreme Court decision in Dow Chemical Co. could have legitimately
distinguished the Christopher precedent. The Court could have explained
that the fact that DuPont was found to have taken reasonable
precautions when it failed to cover its facility during the construction
phase does not necessarily suggest that Dow had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial photography in its plant, which
remained uncovered after the construction of the plant had been
completed. Alternatively, the Court could have concluded that the
fourteen-year gap between the two cases changed the plaintiff’s
reasonable expectation of privacy because aerial photography became
increasingly common in the interim. Either of these approaches would
have permitted the Court to consider the analogy to the trade secret case
in order to determine its usefulness in evaluating the plaintiff’s
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial photography. Ultimately,
in doing so the Court could then have rejected the analogy as factually
distinguishable. Instead, however, the Supreme Court confusingly
rejected the trade secret precedent as irrelevant solely by virtue of its
state tort law status, rather than because it was factually distinguishable.
Although the Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. found a
factually similar trade secret case “irrelevant” to its Fourth Amendment
analysis by virtue of its state tort law status, this did not put to rest the
question of the appropriateness of analogies between Fourth
Amendment and trade secret cases. Other courts analyzing trade secret
cases have been willing to analogize in the opposite direction to relevant
cases in the Fourth Amendment context. This only exacerbates the
uncertainty regarding the correct treatment of privacy analogies across
the private-public divide, and leaves open the question of whether it is
possible that the analogies are acceptable when analogizing in one
direction, but “irrelevant” when analogizing in the opposite direction.

90. Id. at 248 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id.
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For example, in Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., a Minnesota
Court of Appeals found it appropriate to analogize to the Fourth
Amendment context in deciding a trade secret case involving the privacy
92
of trash. Tennant involved business competitors, Tennant and Advance,
93
who both manufactured and marketed floor cleaning equipment. For
two years, Advance employees went through Tennant’s trash, which had
been disposed of in sealed trash bags, and put in a covered dumpster
behind Tennant’s sales offices in California, which was only used by
94
Tennant. The dumpster diving scheme was conceived by an Advance
95
sales representative, McIntosh. He used the information he gained to
send memos summarizing the content of the stolen documents to
96
Advance’s Vice President of Sales.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a misappropriation of
97
trade secrets claim under the California Unfair Practices Act. The court
pointed out that among the relevant factors in determining whether
information is a trade secret is “the extent of measures taken to guard
98
the secrecy of the information.” The court explained that Tennant had
“disposed of its waste in a manner that would assure secrecy except to
someone particularly intent on finding out inside information” and
concluded that “[t]he measures taken to guard the secrecy of the sales
99
lists were adequate.”
In reaching that conclusion, the court appeared to be influenced by
its earlier discussion of how the case would have been resolved under
100
Fourth Amendment law. The court noted that the law in California was
settled that “an owner retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of a dumpster ‘until the trash [has] lost its identity and meaning
101
by becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash elsewhere.’” The
court found “no reason” to apply a different standard in a civil case
because an owner “has the same expectation of privacy in property
regardless of whether the invasion is carried out by a law officer or by a
102
competitor.” Subsequent to the Tennant decision, the Supreme Court
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash put out
103
for collection under Fourth Amendment law. The key point raised by

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See, e.g., Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 722, 725.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971)).
Id.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
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Tennant is not whether dumpster diving is acceptable, but rather whether
in evaluating a dumpster-diving case in the trade secret context courts
should be analogizing to discussions of the reasonable expectation of
privacy in a dumpster in the applicable Fourth Amendment cases. The
Tennant court strongly suggested that such analogizing was appropriate.
A second court reviewing a dumpster-diving trade secret case
agreed that Fourth Amendment analogies are appropriate, but the actual
impact of the analogy changed in light of evolving Fourth Amendment
law regarding dumpster diving. In Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v.
104
105
Palmer, Palmer, the president of Twi-Ro-Pa, instructed an employee
to collect Winne’s trash and to forward any office documents found
106
therein to him. The documents forwarded included invoices, customer
lists, documents containing the names of factories the plaintiff used, and
107
purchase orders that reflected the cost and pricing of Winne’s orders.
Upon learning of the theft, Winne filed suit alleging trade secret
violations and tortious interference with contractual relationships with
108
customers. After an “improper means” analysis, the court considered
whether Winne had taken adequate protections to protect the trade
109
secret because failure to do so would preclude recovery.
In undertaking its analysis, the Pennsylvania court turned to Fourth
Amendment cases for persuasive authority to determine if there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to protect the trade secret
110
documents left in the trash. Among others, the court discussed the
Supreme Court’s decision in Greenwood holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in trash that has been placed for
111
collection. The Palmer court explained that it found the reasoning in
112
those Fourth Amendment cases to be “persuasive.” Thus, the court
demonstrated its belief that the analysis of the reasonable expectation of
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases can be used as an analogy to
determine similar questions in the trade secret private-sector context.
Although the Palmer court recognized that the Fourth Amendment cases
were “not commercial trade secret cases,” it nonetheless found that “it is
rather difficult to find that one has taken reasonable precautions to
safeguard a trade secret when one leaves it in a place where, as a matter

104. No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
105. Both Winne and Twi-Ro-Pa were competitors in the business of manufacturing and selling
rope. Id. at *1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Id. at *4 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988)).
112. Id.
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of law, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy from prying eyes.”
This language suggests that the court felt that Fourth Amendment law
could set the floor for whether there were adequate precautions taken.
Other courts, however, have not approved of analogizing to Fourth
Amendment cases in analyzing trade secret cases. Unlike the Pennsylvania
court in Palmer, which approved of and used Fourth Amendment
analogies, a California Court of Appeal criticized the use of such
analogies in Tennant. The California appellate court explained that
“Fourth Amendment principles which may be useful in resolving a
114
criminal search and seizure dispute are of little relevance to a civil claim.”
The court expanded that: “The question whether the state’s agents violate a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy by seizing items placed in the
trash for purposes of the constitutional prohibition on unreasonable
searches raises materially different issues” than similar actions taking place
115
in the private sphere.
To summarize, certain courts have found it permissible for trade
secret cases to analogize to the Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy jurisprudence for assistance in determining
whether the plaintiff used reasonable precautions to protect a trade
secret. Other courts, however, have rejected precisely the same sort of
analogy. Additionally, in the reverse context, the Supreme Court found a
factually similar trade secret case to be “irrelevant” in determining
whether a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of
116
These inconsistent
conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis.
treatments of analogies across the public-private divide grow even more
incoherent when the scope of the analysis shifts from the trade secret
context to other areas of privacy law.
B. Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment
The traditional public-private divide in privacy law also plays a role
in the context of workplace privacy. Employers can and do invade the
privacy of their employees in various ways including, but not limited to,
drug testing, medical testing, psychological and personality testing,
polygraph testing, workplace surveillance, monitoring e-mail, and GPS
tracking. If the employee works for a governmental employer then courts
may analyze the privacy invasion under a Fourth Amendment

113. Id.
114. Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 377
n.3 (2002). Although the civil claim being analyzed in the case was for conversion of personal
property, there is no reason to believe that the court’s critique or analysis would be any different for a
civil claim under trade secret law as the same logic applies.
115. Id. (discussing reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of a civil conversion claim).
116. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 (1986).
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framework. If, however, the employee works in the private sector, a
118
Fourth Amendment claim is not available. This difference occurs
because under the state action doctrine, only public-sector employees
119
can bring constitutional claims. As a result, the “[c]onventional wisdom
has long held that public employees with federal constitutional
protections have stronger workplace rights than their private-sector
120
counterparts.” As explained below, the conventional wisdom may no
longer hold true.
Without the ability to pursue Fourth Amendment claims, privatesector employees are limited to pursuing claims under either state common
121
law privacy torts, or various scattered federal and state statutes. Of the
four privacy torts captured in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
intrusion upon seclusion tort is the most applicable in private-sector
122
workplace privacy cases. Under the Restatement’s formulation, the
intrusion upon seclusion tort involves “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
123
person.” Although the Restatement language does not expressly include
“reasonable expectation of privacy” language, in applying this tort, courts
often consider whether the employee had a “reasonable expectation of
117. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
118. Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“It is also true that private
employers, unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment, may engage in practices the government as
employer cannot.”); Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892
(S.D.W.Va. 2009) (“Private employers are free to search their employees because the Fourth
Amendment ‘does not apply to searches by private parties, absent governmental involvement.’”)
(quoting United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000)).
119. See Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 592 F. Supp. at 892.
120. Secunda, supra note 21, at 278.
121. Id. at 279.
122. Factual patterns that would trigger the other privacy torts—false light, public disclosure of
private facts, and misappropriation of name or likeness—occur less frequently in the workplace
privacy context than do facts involving employer intrusion upon seclusion. See Wilborn, supra note 20,
at 842 n.66, 844 (noting that the “tort that most plaintiffs use to challenge employer monitoring and
surveillance is the intrusion on seclusion tort”).
123. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977). For purposes of this
discussion, this Article expressly discusses the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather than the
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law. This is because whereas, forty-one states and the District of
Columbia have applied some version of the intrusion upon seclusion tort, with many expressly
adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation, to date no court has expressly applied the
similar tort from the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law. The Restatement of Employment Law
creates a “new” tort by applying the existing intrusion upon seclusion tort into the employment
context to create the tort of “wrongful employer intrusion upon a protected employee privacy
interest.” The “new” tort consists of an application of the traditional intrusion upon seclusion tort in
the employment context and does not substantively change the doctrinal analysis of the traditional
tort. Therefore, the discussion here ought to apply equally to the new context once courts begin to
adopt the new tort. For an extremely useful analysis of the wrongful employer intrusion tort, see
Secunda, supra note 21, at 294–301.
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privacy” in order to determine whether the employee had a privacy
124
interest that could be intruded upon.
In the public-sector employment context, the Supreme Court has
clearly established that the “Fourth Amendment applies as well when the
125
Government acts in its capacity as an employer.” The precise test for
Fourth Amendment claims against government employers, however,
remains somewhat unclear as a result of various Supreme Court cases
evoking multiple possible tests.
The Court first considered employee rights to privacy in the public
126
workplace in O’Connor v. Ortega in 1987. The case involved the
workplace privacy rights of physician and psychiatrist Dr. Magno
127
Ortega. Dr. Ortega worked as the Chief of Professional Education,
training the young physicians in the psychiatric residency programs at
128
Napa State Hospital, a government-run facility. In 1981, hospital
officials grew concerned regarding possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega’s
management of the residency program, including two charges of sexual
harassment of female hospital employees, discrepancies regarding Dr.
Ortega’s acquisition of a computer for the program, and allegations that
129
he had taken inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident.
During an investigation of these charges, hospital personnel searched Dr.
Ortega’s office, and seized several personal items including a Valentine’s
Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry, as well as billing
130
documentation of one of Dr. Ortega’s private patients. Dr. Ortega sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the search of his office
131
violated the Fourth Amendment.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, a four-Justice plurality
authored by Justice O’Connor applied a two-step analysis for public132
sector workplace privacy Fourth Amendment claims. First, a court
must evaluate “[t]he operational realities of the workplace” in order to
determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are

124. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100–01 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying the
Restatement definition of intrusion upon seclusion and concluding that there was no “reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor”
and thus “any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost”); see also Restatement (Third) of Emp’t
Law § 7.01 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 2014) (observing that the concept of a ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ is common to workplace privacy analyses in both the public and private sectors).
125. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010) (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
126. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
127. Id. at 712–14.
128. Id. at 712.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 713.
131. Id. at 714.
132. Id. at 717, 725–26.
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implicated. The plurality explained that at the first step, “the question
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be
134
addressed on a case-by-case basis.” Second, where the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, an employer’s intrusion on that
expectation “should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under
135
all the circumstances.” This standard involves balancing “the invasion
of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the
government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of
136
the workplace.” The plurality decision evaluated the reasonableness of
the employer’s search by considering both whether the search was
reasonable in its inception, as well as whether it was reasonable in its
137
scope.
Providing the fifth necessary vote, Justice Scalia would have skipped
the plurality’s first-step inquiry into “operational realities” and instead
would assume that searches of the offices of government employees as
well as the personal items in that office always receive a Fourth
138
Amendment inquiry. Having determined that Fourth Amendment
protections are triggered, Justice Scalia would have nonetheless held
“that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to
investigate violations of workplace rules” do not violate the Fourth
139
Amendment.
Although the Court failed to reach a consensus regarding what test
governs the scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment workplace
privacy claims, in each of their opinions the various Justices did appear
to agree that analogies to the private sector are appropriate in
adjudicating these claims. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s apparent
rejection of analogies across the public-private divide in the trade secret
context, in the workplace privacy context each of the key Court opinions
in O’Connor suggested that such analogies to the private sector are
useful and appropriate. On this point at least the Court appears united.
First, the Justice O’Connor plurality opinion in O’Connor suggested
that it is appropriate for courts to analogize to the private sector in
deciding whether a public-sector employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a particular case. In applying the “operational realities” test,
the plurality decision explained that “[p]ublic employees’ expectations of
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 719–20.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 732.
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of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual
140
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”
Second, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in O’Connor also suggests that
analogies to the private sector are appropriate in deciding whether a
public-sector employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, except
Scalia conducts the analysis on a sweeping basis, rather than the case-bycase approach used by the plurality. Justice Scalia “would hold that
government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate
violations of workplace rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as
reasonable and normal in the private-employer context—do not violate
141
the Fourth Amendment.” Thus Scalia’s test would require a court to
decide whether a particular government search is a search of the sort that
is regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context.
One way for a court to figure out if a search is considered reasonable and
normal in the private-employer context is to analogize to the reasoning
of private-sector privacy cases considering a similar type of employer
search. Thus both the plurality and concurring opinions in O’Connor
142
suggest that analogies to private-sector cases are appropriate.
For over two decades after O’Connor, the Supreme Court did not
clarify which of the two analyses—the Justice O’Connor plurality
formulation, or Justice Scalia’s concurring formulation—governed the
scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment rights. During that
time, most judicial decisions and litigants assumed that the plurality
143
decision governed, and most did not address Scalia’s concurring test.
144
In 2010, in City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to elucidate the governing test for public-sector workplace
privacy claims. Instead, the Supreme Court’s decision added further
uncertainty to the scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment
rights in the workplace. The case involved the privacy rights of Jeff
Quon, a police sergeant and Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”)
145
Team member with the Ontario Police Department. The City of
Ontario issued pagers to Quon and his colleagues to help them respond
146
to emergency situations. A written “Computer Usage, Internet and E-

140. Id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
142. In fact, even the dissent in O’Connor suggested a link between the public and private sectors.
Id. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that “the reality of work in modern time, whether
done by public or private employees, reveals why a public employee’s expectation of privacy in the
workplace should be carefully safeguarded and not lightly set aside”) (emphasis added).
143. See Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace,
N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23 n.115) (on file with author) (listing cases ignoring Justice
Scalia, as well as those considering his opinion, but determining that the plurality controlled).
144. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
145. Id. at 750.
146. Id. at 751.
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mail Policy” (“Policy”) gave the city “the right to monitor and log all
network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without
notice,” and explained that “[u]sers should have no expectation of
147
privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” The Policy did
not explicitly apply to text messaging, but the City explained that it
148
would treat text messages the same as e-mails.
After Quon exceeded his monthly text message character allotment,
he was warned that the pagers “could be audited,” but was told that
there was no “intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the
149
overage [was] due to work related transmissions.” Instead, Quon took
advantage of an available opportunity to reimburse the city for the
150
overage fee in lieu of an audit of his messages. Frustrated with this
arrangement, the City decided to determine whether the existing
character limit was too low, or whether the overages were for personal
151
messages. The City requested, received, and reviewed transcripts of
text messages sent by Quon, “and discovered that many of the messages
. . . on Quon’s pager were not work related, and [that] some were
152
sexually explicit.” Quon was disciplined and he filed suit against the
City for various claims, including a violation of his Fourth Amendment
153
right to privacy.
In Quon, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion reviewed the
lingering O’Connor ambiguity on the proper analytical framework for
154
Fourth Amendment claims against government employers.
Unhelpfully, however, the Court concluded it was “not necessary to
155
resolve” which of the two approaches was correct because both
156
approaches “lead to the same result here.” The Court also declined to
resolve whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
157
messages sent on the pager. Instead, the Court assumed arguendo that
Quon did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and proceeded to the
158
second step of the analysis. For the second step, the Court held that the
City’s review of the transcripts of Quon’s text messages was reasonable

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 752–53.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id.

I - Schwartz_18 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete)

December 2015]

12/15/2015 6:01 PM

PRIVACY ANALOGIES
159

167
160

under either the Justice O’Connor or the Justice Scalia approach, and
therefore the City “did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights”
161
under either test.
Although the Quon decision left much to be desired, the Court once
again suggested that analogizing to the private sector is appropriate in
analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of a publicsector Fourth Amendment workplace privacy case. Because the Court
chose to assume without deciding that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, it did not have to actually engage in any privatesector analogies to help determine whether Quon in fact had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace pager. Nonetheless,
language in the decision suggests that the Court would find such
analogies useful and appropriate.
For example, in its dicta the Court noted that at least one amicus
pointed out that some states have recently passed statutes requiring
employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic
162
communications. Unlike in the trade secret context, the Court did not
reject this sort of reasoning as categorically irrelevant. Instead, the Court
explained that “[a]t present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and
163
the law’s treatment of them, will evolve.” This language suggests that
the law’s treatment of private-sector workplace norms remains unclear,
but should those norms solidify, then the private-sector cases would be
appropriate for analogy. Furthermore, the Court’s phrasing that it is hard
to predict the “degree to which society will be prepared to recognize
164
those expectations as reasonable” also suggests that those analogies
can be appropriate because private-sector cases are one way to gauge
whether society is recognizing certain expectations as reasonable.
Additionally, in the portion of the decision applying the alternative
Scalia test, the Court clarified that the search of the pager transcripts
“would be regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer
165
context” and thus would satisfy the Scalia approach. This supports a
reading of the O’Connor case whereby under the Scalia test courts could
appropriately analogize to private-sector cases in order to either support

159. Id. at 764 (“Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and
because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable under the approach of the O’Connor
plurality.”).
160. Id. at 764–65 (“For these same reasons—that the employer had a legitimate reason for the
search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of that justification—the Court also
concludes that the search would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer
context’ and would satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.”).
161. Id. at 765.
162. Id. at 759.
163. Id. at 759–60.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 764–65.
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a conclusion that a particular action is not considered reasonable and
normal, or alternatively that society is prepared to recognize certain
expectations as reasonable.
Despite the apparent consensus within the Supreme Court that
analogies to private-sector expectations of privacy are appropriate to
determine reasonable expectations of privacy in the public workplace
privacy context, the Court never expressly explains why such analogies
166
make sense in this context, whereas similar analogies in the trade secret
context were rejected as irrelevant.
C. Lacking a Common Normative Framework for Privacy Analogies
Just as courts have failed to offer a consistent and coherent
normative framework for using privacy analogies across the publicprivate divide in various contexts, the scholarly literature has not yet
filled the gap. Although scholars and commentators have discussed the
public-private divide in privacy law in various contexts, no one has yet
offered a coherent normative framework for how to determine when
such privacy analogies are appropriate across various substantive areas.
Sam Kamin has written persuasively about the dangers of ignoring
privacy violations by the private sector in favor of a myopic focus on
167
state actors. He offers a descriptive claim that private-sector privacy
invasions are crucial because courts will examine that conduct to
determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
168
in the Fourth Amendment context. As a consequence, “the only way
for individuals to gain protection against governmental intrusions into
their privacy is to actively seek to protect their private information from
169
all prying eyes, public and private.” Kamin claims that courts have
wrongly focused on the actual conduct of the private sector rather than
170
the legality of that conduct. As he explains, “the Court’s focus is
generally on what members of the public could do as a practical matter,
171
not what they are permitted to do as a legal matter.” As a result of this
observation he contends that “laws designed to protect individual privacy
from private actors are unlikely to increase the scope of privacy from the
172
government.” Kamin’s contribution focuses on private-sector conduct
rather than the circumstances in which courts should analogize to cases
involving private-sector conduct.

166. See Kim, supra note 143, at 25 (“[T]he Court has not clearly spelled out why the analogy is
relevant.”).
167. Kamin, supra note 88, at 84.
168. Id. at 85.
169. Id. at 87.
170. Id. at 86.
171. Id. at 112.
172. Id. at 107.
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Kamin does suggest, however, that the Court’s use of privacy
analogies to the private sector should be considered appropriate in
determining the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in public173
sector cases. For example, he notes that state government assertions of
the privacy expectations of their citizens “ought to be relevant to a
federal court’s determination of whether a particular individual enjoyed
174
a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Similarly, he contends that
“nothing would prohibit a federal court from considering the fact that a
state has protected the defendant against exactly the sort of privacy
175
invasion engaged in by government agents in a given case.” Because
these claims are not the main focus of his contribution, however, Kamin
does not explain whether such analogies would be appropriate in every
case, nor offer any framework for determining when such analogies
should be used.
Margot Kaminski and Kevin Bankston advocate analogizing to the
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy standard in the
subset of private-sector cases that involve statutory references to a
176
reasonable expectation of privacy. They argue that where a state
statute expressly uses the exact phrase “reasonable expectation of
privacy” courts should strongly presume that the legislature meant to
incorporate the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding that term
177
unless there is clear evidence otherwise. Where, however, the statute
more obliquely references the reasonable expectation of privacy standard,
they contend only that courts “may” reference the Fourth Amendment
178
jurisprudence by analogy. In that second statutory category, the
framework provided by this Article could provide guidance to the Court
in deciding whether to use the Fourth Amendment analogy or not.
Other scholars have written about analogizing across the publicprivate divide in the specific context of workplace privacy. In her earlier
work, Pauline T. Kim has argued that “constitutional cases can and
should provide experience in identifying those matters socially
recognized to be private when determining the legitimacy of employee
179
claims to privacy under the common law.” Kim explains that the
constitutional cases can “provide further evidence of established privacy
norms by identifying the core areas in which individual expectations of

173. See id. at 142–43.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 143.
176. Margot Kaminski & Kevin Bankston, A Unified Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? What
United States v. Jones Means for Privacy Law Beyond the Fourth Amendment (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
177. Id. (manuscript at 14–17).
178. Id. (manuscript at 17–18).
179. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio St.
L.J. 671, 706 (1996).
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180

privacy are recognized as reasonable.” More recently, however, Kim’s
work rejects analogies in the opposite direction, arguing that “[r]elying
on an analogy to private employment to interpret public employees’
181
constitutional rights is a mistake.” According to Kim, the analogy is
inapt “[b]ecause the government employer stands in a different
182
relationship to the public and to the market.”
Similarly, Paul Secunda bemoans what he sees as “the equalization
of privacy rights in the public and private sector” that has resulted from
the Court’s willingness to look to the private sector in determining
183
Secunda contends that
public-sector workplace privacy cases.
“[n]ormatively, public employees should [receive] stronger workplace
184
privacy [protection] than their private-sector equivalents.” Consequently,
Secunda advocates a new two-step approach for workplace searches in the
185
public sector. Because his analysis focused solely on workplace privacy
issues, however, Secunda’s arguments do not offer any guidance for
analogizing beyond the workplace privacy context.
Other scholars have criticized the public-private distinction in the
workplace privacy context, and have gone so far as to advocate
eliminating the distinction altogether because it “simply does not make
186
sense.” For example, Professor Betsy Malloy contends that given an
aggregation of wealth and power, private employer invasions of privacy
187
can be just as invasive and harmful as government invasions of privacy.
As a result, she “advocates the elimination of what has become an
188
anachronistic inequality in the treatment of workplace privacy.”
Wilborn would achieve that result by the enactment of a comprehensive
189
federal statute protecting the right to privacy of all employees. Other
scholars have advocated abandoning the public versus private dichotomy
completely by means of a new test that would find the majority of private
190
employment behavior would constitute state action. Such solutions are

180. Id. at 705–06.
181. Kim, supra note 143 at 6 (writing about both privacy and First Amendment rights).
182. Id. at 27.
183. Secunda, supra note 21, at 281.
184. Id. Many of his arguments in favor of this normative position that public employees should
have stronger workplace privacy rights than private-sector employees are extremely persuasive. In
fact, some of them get incorporated into the normative framework for when privacy analogies are
appropriate. See infra notes 216, 238.
185. Secunda, supra note 21, at 282.
186. See Wilborn, supra note 20, at 831.
187. Id. at 830.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 832.
190. See, e.g., Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond a Brick and Mortar Understanding of State
Action: The Case for a More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee Privacy in the
Workplace, 4 Charlotte L. Rev. 1, 13–42 (2013) (advocating revisiting various aspects of the state
action doctrine in order to limit the ability of the employer to invade employee privacy); David H.J.
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unlikely to succeed as no such comprehensive federal statute has found
its way through Congress, and there appears no realistic elimination of
the state action doctrine on the horizon. Furthermore, such solutions
would not help to answer the question of whether courts in other privacy
contexts should analogize across the public-private divide.
Others have addressed the topic of analogizing across the publicprivate divide in the context of the Fourth Amendment and trade
191
secrets. For example, one commentator, recognizing that some courts
have used a Fourth Amendment analogy in trade secret cases, points out
192
that “the analogy is appealing in some respects.” In other ways,
however, he finds the analogy unattractive “particularly in light of the
trade secret treatment of accidental disclosure, disclosure to third parties,
193
misrepresentation of identity, and the relevance of the costs of privacy.”
Although this critique uses the language of “analogy,” it seems to conflate a
Fourth Amendment analogy, which can merely be useful for analyzing
certain elements of a trade secret claim, with entirely substituting the
194
Fourth Amendment test for the trade secret framework.
Another commentator argues even more strongly that although
some courts have suggested that certain standards within trade secret
cases “can be derived by analogy to Fourth Amendment privacy
jurisprudence,” the Fourth Amendment analogy fails as a result of the
differences between the underlying sources of trade secret law and
195
Fourth Amendment law. Among the various critiques of the analogy is
that it “would leave courts without guidance in determining when” the
196
analogy would apply. The best way to solve that problem, suggests the
argument, is to simply say that the analogy should never apply. This
Article offers a different solution by presenting guidance to courts to
evaluate when such analogies make sense.

Hermann III, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict
Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 140–49 (1971) (explaining using the private
state action approach to obtain constitutional protection for private employees).
191. Other scholars have explored the descriptive potential of other aspects of intellectual
property law as a metaphor for describing Fourth Amendment law. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching
Secrets, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1239, 1244 (focusing on copyright law as a descriptive metaphor to think
about Fourth Amendment cases).
192. Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the
Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182.
193. Id. at 1182–83.
194. This becomes further apparent later in the analysis. See id. at 1183 (“A Fourth Amendmentlike privacy interest is therefore too sweeping; it would create unnecessary causes of action that
presently do not exist and would undermine trade secret law by reducing the need for security
measures.”).
195. Judge Richard Posner, Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the
Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 461, 462 (1992).
196. Id. at 472.
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Other commentators have supported courts drawing an analogy to
the Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
determining whether a trade secret owner has used reasonable
197
precautions in protecting her trade secret. Under this view, if the owner
of a trade secret has a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth
Amendment purposes, that owner has used reasonable precautions in
protecting the trade secret, and thus any violation of that reasonable
198
expectation of privacy would constitute trade secret misappropriation.
In addition to the literature addressing analogizing across the
public-private divide within specific Fourth Amendment contexts, other
scholars have addressed analogizing across the public-private divide
outside the Fourth Amendment context. For example, Lior Strahilevitz
advocates analogizing across the public-private divide in the context of
199
More precisely, Strahilevitz supports courts
information privacy.
200
analogizing to a reunified version of the common law of torts, in
interpreting various aspects of information privacy law beyond the
Fourth Amendment, such as, for example, the Freedom of Information
201
Act’s (“FOIA”) privacy provisions. Specifically in the FOIA context,
Strahilevitz notes that it “is natural to analogize between the common
law invasion of privacy and the statutory ‘unwarranted invasion of
202
personal privacy’” language in the statute. Strahilevitz acknowledges
that:
Courts must be able to recognize when an analogy breaks down, and
must continue to do what the common law tradition asks of them—
scrutinize precedents from peer and inferior courts carefully, follow
them when appropriate, and reject them when their premises have
203
been falsified or when their analysis does not persuade.

One way to look at the project of this Article is that it offers courts a
coherent and consistent way to recognize when the analogy breaks down
204
and should be rejected, or is appropriate and should be persuasive.

197. Peter J. Courture, Independent Derivation and Reverse Engineering, in Victoria Cundiff,
Trade Secret Protection and Litigation: Protecting Confidential Business and Technical
Information 635 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 340, 1992).
198. Id.
199. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 2007, 2010–11 (2010).
200. Id. at 2011. For an interesting discussion of his argument that the four Prosser privacy torts
should be reunified, see id. at 2012–15.
201. Id. at 2014–32.
202. Id. at 2020.
203. Id. at 2037–38.
204. Additionally, other scholars have addressed the public-private divide in contexts unrelated to
privacy. See, e.g., Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment,
46 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 37–43 (2013) (addressing the public-private divide in the First Amendment
context).
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Although all this literature makes useful and important contributions
to various aspects of the problem, to date neither courts nor scholars have
offered a coherent and consistent normative framework for determining
when courts ought to analogize across the public-private divide in various
areas of privacy law. The remainder of the Article seeks to fill that void.

II. Reconsidering the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law
This Part identifies and explores the possible justifications behind
the traditional strict divide between the legal treatments of privacy
violations that occur in the public sector from those that occur in the
private sector. It begins by identifying various institutional features that
may have historically justified distinguishing government invasions of
privacy from private-sector invasions of privacy. For each justification, it
then points out ways in which that traditionally governmental feature
may now manifest itself in the private sector in the modern world.
A. Justifications for the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law
205

The state action doctrine that exists throughout constitutional
law means that the Constitution generally applies to governmental
action, but not to private action. This is presumably based on an insight
that there is something necessarily and categorically different about the
207
government. Similarly, the public-private divide in privacy law, as a
specific application of the state action doctrine to the Fourth
Amendment, is presumably based on an intuition that there is something
necessarily and categorically different about privacy violations when they
occur by the government, as opposed to those that occur by private208
sector actors. For Lillian BeVier that intuition is captured in the very
206

205. Numerous scholars have criticized the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note
19, at 503–04 (“There are still no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”); Jody
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 (2000) (identifying the challenges with
applying the state action doctrine). This Article does not enter that debate. Suffice it to say that the
state action doctrine both generally, and in the privacy context, is likely here to stay.
206. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration
Paradigm, 124 Yale L.J. 2994, 3035–38 (2015) (discussing the debates over whether arbitration
misconduct can constitute state action and thus trigger the Fourteenth Amendment).
207. Cf. Shinar, supra note 204, at 37 (noting in the First Amendment context that the state action
doctrine “rides on the intuition that there is something special about government”).
208. Daniel Solove implicitly suggests this idea when he contends that the real problem with the
extensive collection of personal information by the private sector is the widespread information flow
from the private sector to the government. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1133–38 (describing the
transfer of personal information from the private sector to the government in light of the harms of the
government having that information); see also Lillian R. BeVier, The Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1049,
1053 (1999) (“[O]ne must distinguish between threats to privacy that are posed by private parties and
those that come from the government.”).
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209

notion and definition of “sovereign power.” As she explains, “[t]he
threats posed by government eavesdropping or electronic surveillance
are troublesome precisely because they are posed by the government,
that ubiquitous repository of sovereign power whose actions by definition
have implications and consequences different in kind from those of private
210
actors.”
There are at least four features that traditionally distinguish the
government from private actors that could support the intuition that the
public sector should be treated differently from the private sector with
regard to invasions of privacy. First, the government has powers of
211
coercion that were not traditionally wielded by the private sector.
Second, governmental invasions of privacy can harm the abilities of
individuals to make decisions about elements of their own identities by
212
causing the individual to fear governmental reprisal based on their choices.
In addition to the limit this can cause on individual self-determination, this
213
can also impact the free and open participation in democracy. Third,
the government historically had access to more sophisticated technology
214
than society at large. Finally, the bureaucratic nature of government
215
can lead to various societal and individual harms.
1.

Government Has the Unique Power of Coercion

First, and perhaps most significantly, society may have a different
expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the public sector because traditionally the
government could exercise power that exceeded the power of the private
216
sector. This unique power results from a combination of coercion, state
power, and the monopoly features of government. In its most extreme
form, the traditional governmental police power involves the ability to
take away an individual’s liberty by placing them in jail, disrupting their
lives and homes by searching them indiscriminately, or at the extreme
even taking their lives. As Jody Freeman put it, “[e]ven in an era marked
by the rise of multinational corporations . . . the claim that public power
is more menacing than private power remains unmovable as a pivot point
217
in American public law.”

209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See infra Part II.A.1.
212. See infra Part II.A.2.
213. See infra Part II.A.2.
214. See infra Part II.A.3.
215. See infra Part II.A.4.
216. See Secunda, supra note 21, at 303 (explaining that the state action doctrine is justified by the
“power of the state in relation to the power of a private actor”).
217. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 588 (2000).
Adam Shinar has made a similar point in the First Amendment context, where he points out that the
government “is often the only source of legitimate violence, and its status as provider of public goods
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With regard to privacy law more specifically, many scholars have
contended that the Fourth Amendment should best be seen as protecting
individuals from government power and coercion. For example, Paul
Ohm has argued that “[p]ower seems to be the amendment’s essence, not
218
merely a proxy for something deeper.” Similarly, Bill Stuntz contended
219
that the Fourth Amendment should focus on coercion and violence.
There is also some historical support for this government powerbased justification for the public-private divide. Scholars have contended
that the colonists designed the Fourth Amendment to respond to the
British Crown’s practice of general warrants, which allowed them to
220
search people and their homes without suspicion. Under this view, the
conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment as about “security from
unreasonable government intrusion” stems from the colonists’ experience
221
with the “arbitrary exercise of [British] power to invade their property.”
In many ways related to this idea of government power is a fear that
if taken to the extreme, too many governmental invasions of privacy
could allow the government to morph into the totalitarian state captured
in our collective imagination by the Big Brother government in George
222
Orwell’s 1984. The Big Brother metaphor remains persuasive as one of
223
A
the dangers of unfettered government access to information.
totalitarian government presents a source of fear due to its ability to
“achiev[e] total domination by monitoring every facet of its citizens’
224
private lives.” Even in the absence of the totalitarian extreme, one
version of the fear of government power is that the more society takes on
totalitarian features, the greater the ability of the government to exercise
225
social control over its citizens.
Part of the source of the government’s power is the extent to which
the government has a monopoly in various ways. As Adam Shinar points
requires an element of coercion and authority that is not found in the market.” Shinar, supra note 204,
at 39.
218. Ohm, supra note 31, at 1338; see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The
Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1325, 1326 (2002)
(“The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy. This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment
has nothing to do with privacy—the amendment clearly addresses privacy, or more precisely, the right
of the people to be secure. Rather, the amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the
people’s authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when
government may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”).
219. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 446
(1995).
220. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 199, 296–97 (1993).
221. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?,
33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 307, 351–52 (1998).
222. See George Orwell, 1984 (1949).
223. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1101–02.
224. Id. at 1101.
225. See id. at 1102.
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out, the government “is often the sole source of a particular service,” so
226
there is no ability to opt out. Many of the government’s services, such
as the criminal and civil justice systems, national defense, and police,
were at least traditionally public goods for which the government had a
227
monopoly. This is exacerbated by the fact that moving to a different
228
This
country (or state) is challenging or sometimes impossible.
monopoly power increases the coercive nature of state power as opposed
to private sector power where most of the time there is more choice.
2.

Government Privacy Invasions Can Harm Individual Identity
Formulation and Democracy

A second possible justification for traditionally treating publicsector invasions of privacy as different in kind from private-sector
invasions of privacy is that government privacy invasions can harm the
ability of individuals to make identity-forming decisions about
themselves. It can also inhibit individuals from engaging in democratic
activities. This difference can also explain why society is prepared to
differentiate between a reasonable expectation of privacy from the
government versus a reasonable expectation of privacy from the private
sector. There are various possible formulations of this justification.
First, there is the extent to which government privacy invasions can
harm individual identity formulation and conversely the absence of
privacy can impede the ability of individuals to express themselves and
otherwise form their own identities. As other scholars have previously
recognized, Fourth Amendment rights “create the environment necessary
229
for other freedoms to flourish.” In the absence of adequate privacy
protection “government information-gathering can severely constrain . . .
230
This occurs because the excessive
individual self-determination.”
government invasions of privacy regarding an individual’s activities can
“corrupt individual decisionmaking about the elements of one’s identity”
by causing the individual to fear governmental repercussions based on

226. Shinar, supra note 204, at 39.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 40. The challenges of moving exacerbates the government’s monopoly because
individuals are faced with the choice between accepting the government’s various invasions of their
privacy or moving to somewhere where their privacy would not be invaded. If moving is extremely
difficult or impossible, that means that there is no ability to opt-out of the government’s privacy
invasions.
229. Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1241 (1988); see also Monrad
G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police
Sci. 255, 264 (1961) (“All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political
action, presuppose that arbitrary and capricious police action has been restrained. Security in one’s
home and person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.”).
230. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1101–02.
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individual choices.
This harm to self-determination
can occur
unintentionally even if the government entities are not attempting to
engage in social control or to intimidate individuals from engaging in
233
certain activities.
Relatedly, as a subset of self-determination, government invasions
of privacy can harm an individual’s freedom of association. The Supreme
Court has recognized the “vital relationship between freedom to
234
associate and privacy in one’s associations.” As a result, in the First
Amendment context the Court has limited the government’s power to
compel disclosure of group membership, an activity that would constitute
an invasion of privacy, noting that “when a State attempts to make
inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations” such inquiries “discourage
235
citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.”
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of self-determination and
interference with freedom of association is the extent to which
government invasions of privacy can interfere with deliberative
236
democracy. As Shinar explains, “because of their dependence on elected
officials for resources and funding, government institutions, unlike private
firms, are more vulnerable to the risk of being used for improper political
237
purposes.”
A variation of this theme may help justify why many scholars
advocate a system in which public employees should have stronger
privacy protections from their public employer than private employees
do from their private employees. Just as in general governmental
invasions of privacy may harm individual decision making including
participation in democracy in the employment context, invasions of
privacy by the public-sector employer into the privacy of the publicsector employee may harm the ability of the public employee to be the
whistleblowing voice of other citizens against government waste, abuse,
238
On the other hand, it is also possible to make the
and fraud.
diametrically opposite argument that society ought to be willing to
recognize a lower expectation of privacy from public-sector employees
231. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609, 1657 (1999).
232. Cf. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 70, 92–93 (2012) (explaining the importance of self-determination
to individual personhood in the First Amendment context).
233. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1102 (noting “even if government entities are not attempting to
engage in social control” the governmental invasions of privacy may still harm self-determination).
234. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
235. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
236. See Schwartz, supra note 231, at 1651–52 (arguing that inadequate protection of privacy can
inhibit people from engaging in democratic activities).
237. Shinar, supra note 204, at 40.
238. Secunda, supra note 21, at 306–09 (noting, inter alia, that “employee privacy rights in the
public sector are crucial so that these employees can fulfill their role of ensuring government
transparency and accountability”).
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than private-sector employees precisely because the public sectoremployees have special responsibilities and powers that have to be
exercised in accordance with the public trust, such that the exercise in
monitoring government is particularly strong. These sorts of arguments
certainly appear relevant when considering such hot topic current issues
as whether police officers should have to wear body cameras, a policy
decision which necessarily invades the privacy of the police officer, but
perhaps can be justified by the great responsibilities and powers given to
the police. Hence, which of these arguments carries the day may depend
in part on the particular type of governmental employee, and other
factually specific considerations involving the degree of power given to
the particular employee.
Overall, however, the increased concern that privacy invasions by
the government are more likely to harm individual self-determination as
well as participation in democracy may help justify the public-private
divide in how society wants to think about reasonable expectations of
privacy across the two sectors.
3.

Government Has Access to Superior Technology

A third justification that might distinguish reasonable expectations
regarding government invasions of privacy from similar invasions by the
private sector is the government’s superior capabilities with regard to
technology. The Supreme Court has suggested that this difference
between the public and private sector constitutes part of the justification
for the public-private divide. In Dow Chemical Co., the Court stated in
dictum that “[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite
239
technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”
240
The Court followed similar logic in Kyllo v. United States, ruling that
the government violates the Fourth Amendment when it uses technology
that is “not in general public use” to see “details of the home that would
241
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”

239. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
240. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
241. Id. at 40; see also Nadia B. Soree, Show and Tell, Seek and Find: A Balanced Approach to
Defining a Fourth Amendment Search and the Lessons of Rape Reform, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 127,
225–26 (2013) (describing the Kyllo decision as “significant because the Court signaled its
understanding that when police resort to extraordinary technological measures to invade privacy, with
such means being generally available only to police, individuals fail to successfully resist the intrusion,
both because successful resistance is not feasible in light of the superior technological capability of the
police, and because people would not be on notice of the need to resist.”). Of course, often technology
that is unique to government at the time later becomes available to the private sector as well. This is
the case with the technology in Kyllo which is now available by app in the private sector. See Don
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Various scholars have pointed out the importance of the
government’s technological superiority to the Fourth Amendment
framework. For example, Orin Kerr has suggested that the Fourth
Amendment precedent, at least in the criminal context, can be seen as
implementing a goal by courts to balance governmental advances in
technology with advances in technology that thwart the government’s law
242
enforcement aims. Under Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory, courts
implementing the Fourth Amendment strive to protect a technologically
243
level playing field. Similarly, Paul Ohm agrees that “[t]hrough the
Fourth Amendment the Framers provided a fixed ratio between police
efficiency and individual liberty, and as technological advances change
this ratio, judges can interpret the amendment in ways to change it
244
back.” For Ohm, this ratio can be determined by examining the metrics
245
of crime fighting such as how long investigations take. Thus, the
government’s access to superior technology comprises another possible
difference between the public and private sectors that may justify
treating reasonable expectations of privacy across the public-private
divide differently.
4.

Government Is Too Bureaucratic

A fourth possible reason justifying the traditional public-private
divide in privacy law is that government invasions of privacy are subject
to the harms that routinely arise as an inevitable consequence of
246
bureaucratic settings. According to Daniel Solove, the harms from
government privacy invasions are amplified because of the bureaucratic
nature of government that causes decisionmaking without sufficient
accountability, the dangers that arise from “unfettered discretion,” and
the focus on short-term goals at the expense of a long-term view of the
247
world.
To be clear, this justification is less rooted in history than some of
the earlier suggested justifications, as at the time of the Fourth
248
Amendment, there were no organized police forces. Rather, it is a

Clark, Smart Phone Add-Ons Offer Thermal Imaging, Wall St. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/smartphone-add-ons-offer-thermal-imaging-1408396425.
242. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. 476 (2011).
243. Id. at 480; see also Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
531 (2007).
244. Ohm, supra note 31, at 1346.
245. Id.
246. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1104.
247. Id.
248. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 82 (1988).
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more modern justification in support of the traditional public-private
divide. In today’s modern world, law enforcement has become highly
249
bureaucratized. Solove contends that as a result of the tremendous
pressures on law enforcement agencies to capture criminals, solve crimes,
prevent crime, and prevent terrorism, the bureaucracy is subject to bad
250
exercises of discretion, short cuts and obliviousness.
Of course the bureaucratic nature of government may not be
entirely negative. Shinar argues that the government is in fact
deliberately “more ‘bureaucratic’ than their private sector analogues.”
He contends that bureaucracy is the intentional limit on the powers of
government: “[w]e the people insist that they be more constrained, that
251
there be more red tape.” Regardless of whether these features mean
that there is an inevitable negative side effect of bureaucracy, or its very
purpose, the bureaucratic nature of government may justify treating the
government differently, whether as a symptom of a problem, or because
bureaucracy is the very remedy itself for limiting the powers of
government.
B. Reconsidering the Justifications for the Public-Private Divide
Thus far this Part has explored the intuition that there is something
necessarily and categorically different about privacy violations when they
occur by the government, as opposed to privacy violations by the private
sector, and has offered four possibilities for differences that at least
traditionally distinguished the government. This next portion seeks to
reconsider those differences, and to point out that in the modern world it
is not always obvious that those features belong uniquely to the
252
government. Rather, in today’s society these dangers are equally
possible in the private sector depending on the particular circumstances.
To be clear, the purpose of this Subpart is not to argue that the
government and the private sectors are universally identical, or that the
state action doctrine should be abolished. Rather, by pointing out that at
times the private sector has come to have many of the features that
traditionally distinguished government, this Subpart sets up the
argument in Part III that courts should look for the presence of these
features in deciding whether an analogy across the public-private divide
is appropriate.

249. Solove, supra note 31, at 1106.
250. Id.
251. Shinar, supra note 204, at 40.
252. It is certainly possible that at the time of the Fourth Amendment that there was a categorical
difference between the government and the private sector with regard to these dangers. I am not a
historian, and will not weigh in on that point, but I certainly do not dispute it and am inclined to
believe it was true. My point is about the realities of the modern world.
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Private Sector Can Also Have the Power of Coercion

The first differentiating feature considered in the justification of the
public-private divide is that the government traditionally has unique
power that exceeds the power of the private sector. The strongest form of
this power occurs when the government is acting within its capacity for
police power whereby it is capable of harming actual freedom and liberty
and even taking the life of individuals.
Though the police power is the strongest form of government
coercion, certain private-sector entities also exert government-like police
power. For example, private-sector policing groups such as security
guards have received increased authority, and some can go so far as to
253
functionally arrest or detain individuals. Similarly, the private sector
exercises police-like power when government agencies hire private
security companies to perform work that was previously carried out by
254
law enforcement officers. Although others have contended that in
these circumstances the state action doctrine should not bar application
255
of the Fourth Amendment to the private-sector actors, such an extreme
change in the doctrine is unlikely to occur. This Article suggests instead
that courts facing such private-sector invasions of privacy that closely
resemble police-power ought to feel free to analogize to similar cases in
the Fourth Amendment context as persuasive authority. These analogies
would recognize that there remain some differences between the privatesector police power and the public-sector police power, such as the
ability to send an individual to jail. These differences may caution against
directly applying the Fourth Amendment, but nonetheless may support
the use of analogies in determining the reasonable expectation of privacy
of the individual from the coercive private-sector actor in the context of a
private-sector case.
Of course many types of government action do not involve the
government police power. Nonetheless, the government has historically
had other forms of power and coercion at its disposal, including
economic power. In the modern world, the private sector too, however,
has the potential for a great deal of power. As Professor Malloy has
argued in the workplace privacy context, “the aggregation of wealth and
power . . . has given private employers the same capacity to threaten
privacy as the government. Thus, the threat originally seen to emanate
just from government now arises in the commercial sector—a threat

253. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 50
(2004).
254. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1177 (1999).
255. See generally Joh, supra note 253 (contending that this private policing trend warrants
application of Fourth Amendment protections to situations where private-sector security guards
engage in such police-power behavior).
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that . . . can be just as invasive and harmful as government
256
surveillance.”
Similarly, the private sector is not immune from the fears that
underlie the surveillance capabilities of Big Brother. Just as the
totalitarian government incites dread due to its ability to achieve total
societal “domination by monitoring every facet of its citizens’ private
257
lives,” companies like Google are capable of monitoring every aspect
of private lives as well. And it is not always obvious that individuals have
the right to opt-out of such private-sector monitoring. Furthermore, just
as the government’s monopoly power can result in coercive elements
within its services, there are numerous aspects of the private sector that
also contain monopoly-like features. This can lead to an inability to
entirely opt out of the system. For example, this is increasingly true in a
difficult job market where the lack of meaningful alternatives and the
pervasive fear of unemployment cause more dependence on the
employer. This results in the removal of some constraints on employer
invasions of privacy that would otherwise have existed in a more
competitive market.
2.

Private Sector Can Also Harm Individual Identity Formulation
and Democracy

Just as government privacy invasions can harm individual identity
formulation and deter individuals from engaging in democratic activities
including whistleblowing, certain private-sector privacy invasions can
cause similar harms. Prominent sociologist Amitai Etzioni has recounted
the various ways in which private-sector invasions of privacy can have
many of the same effects as violations committed by the government
258
including the “‘chilling’ of expression and dissent.” Etzioni offers the
examples of gays who are outed by the media, banks who call in loans of
individuals they find out have cancer, and employers who refuse to hire
259
individuals because of their political or religious views. All of these
possible harms from private-sector privacy invasions can result in
individuals hesitating to be open with and true to aspects of their
identity.
Similarly, social pressure from whatever source, governmental or
private sector, can deter individuals from engaging in democratic
activities. Think for example, of the recent CEO of Mozilla who was
fired for engaging in a form of democratic activity, namely for making a

256.
257.
258.
259.

Wilborn, supra note 20 at 830.
Solove, supra note 31, at 1101.
Etzioni, supra note 31, at 934.
Id.
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personal political donation. In light of that experience and many others
like it, it seems reasonable to believe that private-sector invasions of
privacyfrom the media, employers, social media, and so oncan
influence individual behavior perhaps even more strongly than
government invasions of privacy in many circumstances. This suggests that
where a particular private-sector privacy invasion would be likely to
impact either individual identity formation, or participation in democracy, or
both, analogizing to similar governmental invasions of privacy would be
more appropriate.
3.

The Private Sector Has Unprecedented Access to Technology

Although traditionally the public-private divide in privacy law may
have been justified by the fact that the government had access to privacyinvading technology that was unavailable to the private sector, that
difference has begun to break down. In the modern world many
companies have access to the sorts of privacy-invading technologies that
traditionally would have been exclusively in government hands. There are
countless examples of this phenomenon. As Mary Leary has persuasively
noted, the modern day privacy threat is not always governmental
because “private commercial entities have introduced technologies into
daily life which fail to afford individuals the opportunity to demonstrate
261
an expectation of privacy.” Leary points to such examples as the
commercially-available satellite imaging technology of Google Earth, the
Internet tracking of personal information, and the geospatial locating of
262
cell phones, all of which are not limited to the government.
For instance, traditionally only the government would have had
263
access to satellite technology. Prior to the new millennium, satellite
technology was limited to the realm of the military and intelligence
264
communities. These days, satellite-based technologies, such as Google
Earth, are not only available to corporations such as Google, but have
265
become mainstream and available to the general public.

260. See Tony Bradley, Backlash Against Brendan Eich Crossed a Line, Forbes (Apr. 5, 2014, 9:22
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2014/04/05/backlash-against-brendan-eich-crossed-a-line/.
261. Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of
Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 331, 333 (2012).
262. Id. at 332–33.
263. Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military Use of Satellite Communications, Remote Sensing,
and Global Positioning Systems in the War on Terror, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 69, 71 (2014) (noting that
“before the present millennium, military and civilian satellites were usually exclusive of each other and
both tended to be government owned”).
264. Id.
265. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2321, 2344 (2007) (noting
that satellite photos “are now much more widely available to the public, thanks to services such as
Google Maps”).
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Similar phenomena occur with all sorts of privacy-invading
technologies as their use becomes more widespread in the private sector.
Observers have noted the privacy-violating potential of such
266
technological developments as Google Glasses. Amazon has announced
267
plans to make use of drones. Additionally, the use of biometric technology
and GPS tracking is widespread in the private sector from employers to
268
other private companies. As a result, the government no longer has
unfettered access to superior technology that is unavailable in other
sectors. As such, courts can no longer automatically rely on governmental
technological superiority to justify treating governmental invasions of
privacy entirely differently from private-sector invasions of privacy.
Rather, courts ought to consider the technological prowess of a particular
private sector privacy-invading actor in deciding whether to analogize to
an equally technologically advanced public-sector Fourth Amendment
case.
4.

Private Sector Can Also Be Extremely Bureaucratic

As for the final justification for the public-private divide in privacy
law, the harms that can occur as a result of the bureaucratic nature of
government, the very same sort of bureaucratic-driven harms can also
take place in the private sector. Scholars have recognized that the private
sector often resembles the sort of bureaucracy typically used to describe
the government. For example, in his influential 1984 Harvard Law
Review article, Gerald Frug contends that corporations and government
agencies share “characteristics that have traditionally identified
269
‘bureaucracy’ as a form of social organization.” Many scholars since
270
have also noted the bureaucratic features of the private sector. In the
privacy context, Solove observes that in the private-sector information is
266. Kashmir Hill, How Google Glasses Make a Persistent, Pervasive Surveillance State Inevitable,
Forbes (Apr. 6, 2012, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/06/how-googleglasses-make-a-persistent-pervasive-surveillance-state-inevitable/.
267. See Gregory S. McNeal, Six Things You Should Know About Amazon’s Drones, Forbes (July
11, 2014, 6:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/07/11/six-things-you-need-toknow-about-amazons-drones/.
268. See generally Elizabeth M. Walker, Note, Biometric Boom: How the Private Sector
Commodifies Human Characteristics, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 831 (2015)
(discussing the increased use of biometric technologies in the private sector); see also Laura
Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the Global Positioning System, Enhanced
911, and the Internet and Their Relationships to the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims and Their
Abusers, 13 Buff. Women’s L.J. 97, 103 (2005) (noting that GPS has shifted from solely a military
instrument to a common tool in the private sector).
269. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1278
(1984).
270. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J.
Corp. L. 657, 661 (1996) (acknowledging that the traditional view of “the corporation as a bureaucratic
hierarchy is largely correct”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1357 (2005).
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often held not by trusted friends or family members, but by “large
bureaucracies that we do not know very well or sometimes do not even
271
know at all.”
Unsurprisingly then, the very harms associated with the
bureaucratic features of government are also common critiques in the
private sector. Above all, the private sector has often been criticized for
272
its lack of accountability. Frug contends that “corporate bureaucratic
power, as it has emerged, has imposed a forceful objective restraint on
273
the shareholders’ ability to govern the corporation.” Thus corporate
bureaucratic power limits accountability to the shareholders. In the
privacy context, Solove has illustrated the lack of accountability by
274
corporations in collecting data. Many have criticized corporations for
275
“unfettered discretion.”
Finally, the critique of government bureaucracies as making choices
based on short-term goals without consideration of the long-term
consequences of the larger social effects is also an extremely common
276
problem in the private sector. Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, Leo Strine Jr. has extensively discussed the problems with
corporations being managed for the short-term at the expense of the
277
long-term. Scholars have also extensively documented this potentially
278
harmful phenomenon. For example, a number of scholars have offered
271. Solove, supra note 31, at 1095.
272. Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391, 464 (1997)
(describing the standard critique of classic liberalism with respect to the corporation as failing to
account for private power which is “the hierarchical authority of management and is thought, by the
terms of the critique, to be unaccountable, unconstrained or arbitrary”). For the classic account of the
absence of accountability, see Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property (Harcourt, Brace, and World rev. ed. 1967) (1932).
273. Frug, supra note 269, at 1306.
274. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1429 (2001).
275. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance:
A Comparative Analysis, 7 Hastings Bus. L.J. 309, 328 (2011) (“Corporations became entities of
immense economic and political power that afford boards of directors and corporate executives
largely unfettered discretion to govern as they see fit, subject only to market pressures and the
agitations of activist shareholders.”); see also Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How
Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public 110 (2012) (“[F]or
most of the twentieth century directors of public companies who did not breach their loyalty duties
enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion to set corporate policy.”).
276. See generally Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (criticizing the emphasis on short-term shareholders in explaining
the short-term governance phenomenon).
277. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1, 10–11 (2010) (explaining that because “institutional investors often have
a myopic concern for short-term performance,” managers have “little reason to think deeply about the
effect of corporate governance proposals on long-term corporate performance”).
278. See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia,
100 Ky. L.J. 531, 531 (2011) (“Short-termism denotes the phenomenon by which some corporate
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this so-called “short-termism” as an explanation for what occurred with
279
the collapse of Enron. This bureaucracy-like focus on short-term goals
at the expense of long-term goals causes the private sector to often have
the same problematic relationship to privacy invasions as its public sector
government counterpart. Overall, many aspects of the private sector
resemble precisely the sort of bureaucracy that epitomizes government.
As such, courts ought to consider the presence of such bureaucratic
characteristics, and the resulting privacy concerns that come along with
them, in deciding whether to analogize between the public and private
sectors.
III. A Normative Framework for Privacy Analogies
This Article is about overcoming the public-private divide for the
purpose of privacy analogies. The important normative question that
courts and scholars continue to evade is whether it is appropriate for a
court analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of a Fourth
Amendment case to consider the fact that in a private-sector case a court
has protected the plaintiff against precisely the sort of privacy invasion
280
the government committed. Or in reverse, whether it is appropriate for
a court engaging in a doctrinally similar analysis in a private-sector
privacy case to take into account a judicial decision from a Fourth
Amendment case in which a court has held that a factually similar
privacy invasion violated a defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.
This Part builds on Part II by suggesting that courts deciding
whether to analogize across the public-private divide should consider the
applicability of the differentiating features identified in Part II that
traditionally distinguished governmental invasions of privacy. This
multifactored analysis should then inform the currently haphazard
question of whether the analogy is appropriate.

managers, responding to pressure from investors or acting to bolster their own position, advert their
attention and exert their energies to achieving short-term profitability, virtually eschewing longer-term
considerations. . . . Short-termism promotes a tendency to overvalue short-term rewards, invariably
leading to an undervaluation of long term consequences.”).
279. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev.
1275, 1283 (2002) (explaining the collapse of Enron in terms of short-term decisionmaking); Jill E.
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 637,
673 (2006).
280. Cf. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1, 29–32 (2013)
(arguing that courts considering Fourth Amendment cases ought to consider wider information
contained in statistical data, clinical evidence, and experience, rather than only intuition and common
sense).
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A. The Normative Framework in the Abstract
Courts should consider whether the specific governmental actor in
the public-sector privacy case that is subject to the potential analogy
exhibits the four features traditionally differentiating government.
Courts should ask themselves: First, did the government in this situation
exercise uniquely governmental coercion or hold monopoly power?
Second, did the government in this case act in such a way that its invasion
of privacy is likely to harm individual self-determination and/or
democratic participation? Third, did the government invade privacy by
using sophisticated technology that exists solely in the hands of the
government? Finally, does the privacy-invading governmental actor
suffer from the various bureaucratic features—namely lack of
accountability, unfettered discretion, and a short-term focus—that can
281
cause invasions of privacy to be particularly harmful?
Courts should then also consider whether the particular privacyinvading actor in the private-sector privacy case that is subject to the
potential analogy also exhibits those four features to a similar extent to
the governmental actor. Did the private-sector actor exercise a similar
degree of power and coercion to the government? Is this particular form
of private-sector invasion of privacy likely to harm individual selfdetermination and democratic participation in a way that is comparable
to the form of privacy invasion exercised by the government? Did the
private-sector actor use a similar technological advantage to that used by
the government? And finally, does the particular type of private actor at
issue share similar bureaucratic features with their accompanying harms
to its public-sector counterpart?
After asking these questions and comparing the two cases along
these four factors, courts can make a better informed decision as to
whether this is an appropriate case for analogizing across the publicprivate divide for the purpose of deciding the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis or its doctrinal equivalent. Should the factors be
sufficiently comparable, then analogizing is appropriate. Should the
factors be sufficiently different, then courts ought to proceed carefully
before deciding to analogize across the public-private divide. As with
many multifactored tests, a concept courts are quite familiar with, no
single factor is dispositive, nor is this a purely quantitative question.
Instead, these factors offer a framework for what sorts of questions
courts ought to consider when deciding whether analogizing across the
public-private divide is appropriate in a privacy law context.
To be sure, particularly in the context of evaluating reasonable
expectations of privacy, courts need to be careful to keep in mind the
role of both floors and ceilings in conducting the analysis. For example,
281. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1104.
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assume that a certain private-sector case finds that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy from the private sector. Then assume
that a second court faces a factually similar case, except that now it is the
government, which is invading the individual’s privacy. The second court
applies the multifactored normative framework suggested above and
concludes that the governmental actor has considerably more of the
traditional factors than the private sector. This would suggest that the
individual ought to have a higher expectation of privacy from the
government than from the private sector. In such a circumstance,
analogizing might still be appropriate because the private-sector case
could constitute a floor for the court to consider. In other words, the
court could conclude that the public ought to have a higher expectation
of privacy from the governmental actor than from a private-sector actor.
The private sector finding remains relevant, however, to show the court
that at the very least the public has a certain level of protection of
privacy from the private sector, such that the level of protection of
privacy from the government must exceed that floor.
Now assume instead that a judicial decision in a private-sector case
finds that the plaintiff does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
from the private-sector actor in that case. A second court considers a
factually similar case, only now it is the government, which is invading
the individual’s privacy. The court engages in the multifactored
normative framework and concludes that the governmental actor has
more of the traditional factors than the private sector. This once again
suggests that the individual has a higher expectation of privacy from the
government than from a private-sector actor. In such a circumstance, the
fact that the earlier case found that the individual did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy from the private-sector actor does not
tell the second court much because the factors indicate that the
individual ought to receive a higher expectation of privacy from the
government than from the private sector.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the reasonable expectation
of privacy analysis is often not outcome determinative of the entire case.
It is plausible that a court may engage in the multifactored normative
analysis described above to determine that a particular plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis is merely one part of the Fourth Amendment analysis. The court
might still determine that despite the fact that the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, that the government’s reason for
invading that privacy nonetheless justifies the intrusion. This difference
in the rationale for the privacy intrusion might justify a different ultimate
outcome in a public-sector case than in a private-sector case, even where
there is a similar reasonable expectation of privacy. The court should be
able to reach a different outcome in the cases while still acknowledging
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that the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of the analysis is
comparable.
B. The Normative Framework Applied to a Hypothetical
To better understand how this normative framework would work in
practice, this Subpart will walk through how a court would approach
analogizing across the public-private divide in the context of a hypothetical
scenario. Assume that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
is investigating potential insider trading and other securities violations at
a medium-sized hedge fund. Traditional investigatory techniques, such as
obtaining a warrant for the company’s documents, might tip off
individuals inside the company. So instead, the SEC decides to hire a
computer systems expert and/or hacker to determine whether there was
any information available from the hedge fund’s computer systems that
could be obtained by someone who knew what they were looking for, but
without violating any laws. The SEC pays the hacker to hack into the
hedge fund’s computers and to investigate any wrongdoing. Although the
hacker, despite being extremely good at what he does, is unable to gain
access to the fund’s e-mails, he is able to exploit exposures in the hedge
fund’s various firewalls to obtain information about all the hedge fund’s
trades for the SEC. Later, when the SEC brings a civil enforcement
action against individuals at the hedge fund for violations of securities
laws, a Fourth Amendment claim is raised based on how the SEC
obtained its information.
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim, one of the questions the
court considers is whether the hedge fund had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in its trades. The government argues that the mere fact that
the computer expert was able to get into the hedge fund’s system
suggests that the fund could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
because many computer experts could have gotten in. The government
also argues that the hedge fund failed to hire a cybersecurity firm, which
many hedge funds have hired to protect themselves. By not hiring such a
firm, the government argues, the hedge fund should have no reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In response, the hedge fund points to a similar case in the trade
secret context. In that case, a computer hacker was found liable for trade
secret violations under the applicable state trade secret law, for similarly
exploiting weaknesses in the computer security of a hedge fund in order
282
to obtain trading secrets. In the trade secret case the hedge fund had
also used a firewall and other protections, but had not hired a

282. This hypothetical is very loosely based on actual events that recently took place in the private
sector. See Myles Udland, A Hedge Fund Was Hacked in a Never-Before-Seen Attack, Bus. Insider
(June 19, 2014, 9:43AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hedge-fund-hacked-in-complex-attack-2014-6.
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cybersecurity firm. Nonetheless, in the context of the trade secret case,
the court found that the hedge fund’s trade strategy was a “trade secret”
under the UTSA meaning that it “is the subject of efforts that are
283
In
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”
deciding whether to analogize to the trade secret case, or even consider it
as persuasive (clearly not binding) in determining whether a hedge fund
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that can be
obtained by a computer hacker, the court ought to begin by engaging in
the multifactored normative framework.
First, the court should consider the power of coercion of the
government versus the private party in the two cases under consideration.
In this hypothetical, the government actor at issue is the SEC. Although
the securities laws prohibit conduct both criminally and civilly, the SEC
is only responsible for civil enforcement and administrative actions. In a
civil enforcement action, the SEC can obtain a court order enjoining an
individual from further violations of securities laws, disgorgement of any
money obtained from the illegal conduct, and in some circumstances
impose civil penalties. Importantly, the SEC may not engage in criminal
enforcement of the federal securities laws, although they can provide
assistance to the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Department of Justice to do so.
Therefore, although the SEC has a good deal of power of coercion in its
civil enforcement role, that power of coercion is not significantly greater
than the power of coercion a hacker has when stealing trade secrets. The
hacker can also coerce the hedge fund to pay large amounts of money, or
if they do not do so can impose a tremendous financial cost on the hedge
fund. Significantly, neither the SEC nor the civil-sector hacker can put
anyone in jail. If the hypothetical were modified such that the Fourth
Amendment claim were being brought in the context of a criminal trial
brought by the U.S. Attorney or U.S. Department of Justice, then the
power of coercion factor would look very different because the
government would be acting at the peak of its power of coercion, thus
suggesting that higher levels of protection should be granted vis-à-vis the
government. Under the existing hypothetical, however, the power of
coercion in both sectors is primarily economic in nature, and therefore
the public and private sectors are relatively comparable for this first
factor.
Next, for the second factor, the court should consider the impact of
each party’s privacy invasion on individual self-determination. The target
of both of these privacy invasions is a hedge fund, but corporations can
have privacy interests by virtue of the individuals that make up those
284
Therefore, a court needs to consider whether the
corporations.

283. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985).
284. Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 27, 59–64 (2014).
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individuals who make up the hedge fund are likely to have their
individual self-determination impacted as a result of the privacy invasion
by either the public-sector or private-sector hacker. Both the publicsector hacker and the private-sector hacker obtained information about
the hedge fund’s trades, and not personal information about employees.
Had the information hacked included such information as employee
personnel files, e-mails and so on, the privacy invasion may have had
more impact on individual self-determination. Under the existing
hypothetical, however, the second factor does not really come into play,
as there is likely minimal impact on individual self-determination from
this type of privacy invasion.
Third, the court should consider the extent to which the government
privacy invasion benefitted from access to superior technology. In this
hypothetical it did not. The government hired a computer hacker, just
like in the trade secret case. Had the government made use of uniquely
government resources, such as NSA databases, or some sort of militaryonly cryptography, this factor would suggest great protection from the
government than the private sector. As the hypothetical currently stands,
this technological advantage factor is comparable for both the public and
private-sector privacy invasions.
Finally, the fourth factor requires the court to evaluate the extent to
which each of the parties contains the sorts of bureaucratic
characteristics that can cause difficulties with privacy invasions. This
factor differs between the public and private sectors in this hypothetical.
The privacy-invading party in the government context, the SEC, is very
much the epitome of a government bureaucracy. The SEC has five
divisions and eleven regional offices throughout the United States. In
285
addition, the SEC has a number of substantive offices. Considering
how many offices and branches they have, the SEC is subject to precisely
the sorts of privacy concerns that exist whenever there are features of a
bureaucracy. By contrast, the court in the hypothetical does not
necessarily have information about who hired the hacker in the trade
secret case. Therefore, there is no reason to necessarily believe that the
trade secret case features the same sort of bureaucratic features as the
SEC. Hence, this last feature suggests that a hedge fund should have a
greater expectation of privacy from the bureaucratic government than
from the private sector.

285. These include the Office of General Counsel; the Office of the Chief Accountant; the Office
of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations; the Office of International Affairs; the Office of Investor
Education and Advocacy; the Office of Economic Analysis; the Office of Information Technology, the
Inspector General, who has a staff of twenty-two; and the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. SEC
Divisions Homepages, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (last visited Dec.
18, 2015).
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Putting all of the factors together, the court will conclude in this
particular hypothetical that the hedge fund should have at least the same
if not more of an expectation of privacy from the government than from
the private sector. Therefore, to the extent that the trade secret case
suggests that society has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a hedge fund’s trading information even if the fund did not hire a
cybersecurity company, the court should feel comfortable analogizing to
the trade secret case. Once again this intermediate conclusion with
respect to analogizing for the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
does not necessarily mean that the two cases should ultimately have the
same result. The court may determine that the fund has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in its trading information, but that the
government’s rationale for engaging in this privacy violation justifies the
privacy intrusion in a balancing analysis in a way that the private sector’s
corporate espionage justification would not.
Now for purposes of thoroughly understanding the multifactored
normative framework, assume that the hypothetical changes such that
the analogizing is happening in reverse. Under the new hypothetical, a
court considering a trade secret case is trying to decide whether the
trading information is in fact a trade secret, which turns on whether the
hedge fund took steps that “are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.” The court is considering analogizing to a Fourth
Amendment case with the same facts as above, in which a court found
that there was a Fourth Amendment violation and thus necessarily that
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court should first
consider each of the four factors precisely as above. This time, however,
the fact that the factors suggest that society might want to give an
individual more of an expectation of privacy from the government than
from the private sector as a result of the government’s bureaucratic
features means that an analogy would likely be inappropriate. Because
the factors suggest that there should be more privacy protection from the
government, the fact that the company received privacy protection from
the government, does not help guide the court as to whether the
company should also receive privacy protection vis-à-vis the privatesector hacker. A similar process would occur in any situation in which
the court was considering analogizing across the public-private divide,
whether in workplace privacy, trade secrets, or any other context.
Conclusion
Various areas of privacy law contain doctrinal similarities, including
some version of consideration of an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. The existence of the state action doctrine means that courts may
not entirely conflate private-sector privacy cases with public-sector
Fourth Amendment cases. Nonetheless, given the doctrinal similarities,
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there are various situations in which courts naturally consider analogies
between the public and the private sector case law to make sense and be
appropriate.
Until now, courts have not had a coherent or consistent normative
framework for deciding whether to apply such analogies across various
privacy law scenarios. In the absence of such a framework, courts seem
to draw analogies in a haphazard manner and without any discussion of
whether and why the analogy makes sense or does not make sense in a
particular case. The multifactored normative framework presented in
this Article represents a starting point to move beyond that seemingly
random and unarticulated system. Moving forward, courts considering
analogizing between public-sector and private-sector privacy cases ought
to evaluate the presence of power and coercion, the impact on selfidentity and democratic participation, the existence of any technological
advantages, and the bureaucratic features of the corresponding privacyinvading powers in both cases. Or, in other words, courts ought to start
looking at when corporations behave like the state because they take on
features that resemble those of the state.
It is certainly possible that courts and scholars may identify other
differences not articulated here between the public and private sectors
that would suggest that courts ought to not analogize across the publicprivate divide when that difference is present. I welcome such additions
and debates. As long as courts and scholars are applying a coherent and
consistent normative framework and articulating the reasons they believe
privacy analogies are or are not appropriate in a particular context, it
would be a substantial improvement over the status quo.
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